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ASSAULT ON MULTINATIONALS:
FRENCH AND AMERICAN REALLOCATION PROVISIONS
Increasing prominence of multinational enterprises has resulted in more
expansive governmental control. Illustrative of this trend is legislation which
enables national authorities to reallocate income among the various members
of a corporate group for tax assessment purposes. Yet, it is not merely a desire to
raise additional revenue that has called these taxing statutes into play.
It is necessary first to define the problem that has given rise to the broader
use of reallocation provisions. Next, an analysis will be made of two of the most
important of these reallocation provisions; Section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code of the United States and Article 57 of the French General Tax Code.
Finally, a brief comparison of their respective applications will precede a predic-
tion as to their future ramifications for the multinational concern.
I. The Problem
The most frequent dispute between multinational companies and govern-
ments arises over the companies' ability to move enormous sums of money
between their affiliates in different countries. It has been estimated that in 1970
the liquid assets of U.S. companies and banks with international operations
amounted to approximately $30 billion, an amount "which flows in giant waves
from one country to another."' This phenomenon can be influenced by govern-
ments, acting alone and in concert, but is beyond their power to control. The
movement of funds within the multinational groups, when several follow the
same policy, can threaten and sometimes destroy national currency exchange
rates, balance of payments, and the availability of credit.'
The multinational companies have not set out to challenge governments,
nor is there anything sinister about the manner in which the funds are transferred.
However, the desire to suffer the least tax liability and to conduct the normal
business operations of providing funds for new investment through repatriation
of profits runs counter to national interests.
Each government safeguards its own interests by not only ensuring that it
secures a fair share of tax from multinational operations but also ensuring that
those operations are consistent with the host country's broad economic objectives.
Multinational companies on the other hand recognize the favorable tax con-
sequences which arise when income is declared in countries with the lowest tax
rates and realize that tax savings can be achieved by money transfers among
subsidiaries in the multinational group.'
Of course, undesirable monetary transfers have not been simple for govern-
mental authorities to discover. Many diverse methods have been employed to
shift income, deductions, and credits between related corporations: use of
1 Wall Street journal, Feb. 17. 1970, at 7, col. 6.
2 C. TUGENHAT, TuE MULTINATIONALS 161 (1973) [hereinafter cited as TUoENHAT].
3 Id. at 164.
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dividends,4 royalties and interest payments,5 use of loans and other capital trans-
fers,' payment for goods, services and know-how, 7 or manipulation of inter-
company transfer prices.' Yet, as more of these potentially harmful practices are
uncovered, more sophisticated responses have come from concerned national
authorities. Governments have answered by utilizing broadly based reallocation
provisions. These provisions not only ensure a fair taxation of income realized
by individual corporations within a related multinational group but also ensure
that national economic objectives are followed.' To give an indication of the
expansive interpretation now accorded to these provisions, two of the more
frequently employed enactments-Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code and
Article 57 of the French General Tax Code-will be examined and compared.
II. Section 482
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code reads:
In the case of two or more organizations,'0 trades or businesses"l
(whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United
States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled 12 directly or in-
4 Dividend payments have been especially useful in getting money out of countries with
impending economic crises. For example, in 1964 and 1965, when devaluations of the pound
seemed imminent, 30% of 115 surveyed foreign-owned subsidiaries in Britain which had not
paid dividends during the previous three or four years did so. Twenty-five of the 115 remitted
over 100% of their earnings. M. BROOKE AND H. L. REmMERS, THE STRATEGY OF MULTI-
NATIONAL ENTERPRISE (1970).
5 As a substitute for dividend payments, royalties and interest charges are especially useful.
The object of dividend-avoiding procedures is to transfer the resources of the subsidiary com-
pany to the parent in such a form that it does not attract the taxation of the host country; ie.,
that it is not considered a distribution of profit. This can be achieved in one of two main
ways. Resources can be transferred in forms which the taxation authorities recognize as costs
against operating revenues before a trading profit is established. Alternatively, the resources
can be transferred on an allocation of total income which is not subject to corporation taxation
such as interest on loan capital. In either case, tax evasion is effected where only sham trans-
actions are employed. See W. MANSER, THE FINANCIAL ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRsEs 92-94 (1973).
6 This method is especially useful when interest free or rent-free loans (or interest and.
rentals below what would be charged to an unrelated corporation) are employed.
7 For example, by providing personal service or technical assistance without charge or with
a charge other than fair market value.
8 The manipulation of transfer prices is one of the most flexible tools in the hands of a
multinational company. Though it is useful to counteract the effects of exchange control regu-
lations, restrictions on the export of capital or the repatriation of earnings, royalties and interest
payments, the most common reason for manipulating transfer prices is for tax planning. This
can mean anything from systematic avoidance to ensuring that the same profits are not taxed
twice over by two governments, or to taking advantage of an anomaly in the international sys-
tem. See TUGENHAT, supra note 2, 169-173.
9 Basically, the fear of reallocation of income brings with it the fear of double taxation.
Most companies for this reason and other business considerations will decide to respect national
policies of monetary control and to forego the limited advantages of short-term tax avoidance.
See TUOENHAT, supra note 2, at 175-176.
10 The term "organization" refers to an organization of any kind, whether it be a sole
proprietorship, partnership, trust, corporation, etc., irrespective of the place where organized,
where operated, or where its trade or business is conducted, and regardless of whether domestic
or foreign. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (a) (1) (1968) (emphasis added).
11 The term "trade" or "business" includes any trade or business activity of any kind,
regardless of whether or where organized, whether owned individually or otherwise, and regard-
less of the place where carried on. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a) (2) (1968).
12 The term "controlled" includes any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether legally
enforceable, and however exercisable or exercised. It is the reality of the control which is deci-
sive not its form or the mode of its exercise. A presumption of control arises if income or
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directly by the same interests, the Secretary or his delegate may distribute,
apportion or allocate gross income, deductions, credits or allowances between
or among such organizations, trades or businesses, if he determines that such
distribution, apportionment or allocation is necessary in order to prevent
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such organization,
trade, or business.13
Understandably, the allocation of deductions and income is very important
in the international area." Under U.S. tax law, income earned by a foreign sub-
sidiary of a U.S. corporation is generally not taxed until it is returned to the
parent corporation. Thus, a U.S. parent corporation has an incentive to sell to
its foreign subsidiary at a low price if the foreign subsidiary is not subject to
heavy foreign taxation; the subsidiary's income upon resale to foreign customers
will be correspondingly greater, but the parent will not have to report this income
until it is "repatriated" to the parent in the form of dividends.15 Also, if the
subsidiary operates in a country with tax rates substantially lower than the U.S.,
an overall tax savings will result where no dividends to the U.S. parent are
declared. If income can be shifted to a foreign subsidiary or if deductions which
reflect expenses of the foreign subsidiary can be claimed by the U.S. corpora-
tion, the U.S. tax liability can again be lowered.
The purpose of § 482 as a prime weapon against tax evasion' 6 has been to
place a controlled taxpayer on a parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer by de-
termining, according to the standard of an uncontrolled taxpayer, the true taxable
income from the property and business of a controlled taxpayer. The interests
controlling a group of controlled taxpayers are assumed to have complete power
to cause each controlled taxpayer to conduct its affairs and to compile its records
in such manner as to truly reflect taxable income. If this has not been done, the
district director will intervene and by making any adjustments he deems neces-
sary 7 between or among controlled taxpayers constituting the group, shall
deductions have been arbitrarily shifted. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (a) (3) (1968). Thus, two
corporations, each owning 50% of a shopping center, had the requisite control for § 482 pur-
poses, even though they operated competing department stores. Forman Co., Inc. v. Comm'r.,
453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1972).
13 The term "true taxable income" means in the case of a controlled taxpayer, the taxable
income which would have resulted to the controlled taxpayer had it in the conduct of its affairs
dealt with the other member or members of its related group at arm's length. Treas. Reg. §
1.482-1(a)(6) (1968). See Huber Homes, Inc. v. Comm'r., 55 T.C. 598 (1971).
14 With regard to domestic corporations, the advantage of shifting income and deductions
among related corporations or businesses usually results from different rates of taxation applied.
For example, if individual A owns a corporation and can split off part of the income into a
partnership or a proprietorship taxed at a lower rate, then his tax liability will be lower. In the
case of corporations, a surtax exemption allows the first $25,000 of income to be taxed at 22
percent rather than 48 percent. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, an affiliated group of
corporations could claim a surtax exemption for each affiliate (and pay a small penalty tax).
This provision is currently being phased out, but the use of multiple surtax exemptions has
existed since the 1950's and § 482 has played an important role in preventing abuse in this
area.
15 B. BITTXKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAxATION 424 (1972).
16 Section 482 is not the commissioner's only weapon against income splitting between
corporate taxpayers. For example, cases like Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (assignment
of income) as well as the Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) and Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112 (1940) cases have also proved to have great vitality in the field. Likewise the
government may invoke § 269 to disallow deductions, credits, etc., in certain controlled corpo-
ration transactions if the principal purpose is tax avoidance.
17 The director may make any distribution, apportionments, or allocations as he may deem
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determine the true taxable income of each controlled taxpayer.18 The basic
test, though not the sole one, used to determine whether deductions and income
are allocated properly is whether the taxpayers dealt at arm's length-whether
the transaction which occurred between the related parties would have occurred
between unrelated parties as well.
Section 482 and its regulations apply to any controlled taxpayer, whether
such taxpayer makes a separate or a consolidated return.19 However, § 482
grants no right to a controlled taxpayer to apply its provisions at will, nor does
it grant any right to compel the district director to apply such provisions. 0
A. General Application
Current Regulations under § 482 state that transactions between one con-
trolled taxpayer and another will be subjected to special scrutiny to ascertain
whether the common control is used to reduce, avoid, or escape taxes. The
authority to determine true taxable income extends to any case in which either
by inadvertence or design the taxable income in whole or in part of a controlled
taxpayer is other than it would have been had the taxpayer been an uncontrolled
taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer."' However,
special scrutiny is applied to those traditional methods used to shift income and
deductions between related corporations: (1) Loans or advances, (2) per-
formances of service, (3) use of tangible property, (4) transfer or use of in-
tangible property, and (5) sales of tangible property.
Interest-free loans from U.S. parent companies to foreign subsidiaries has
been a long-standing practice. The Service first attacked this practice by imput-
ing an interest charge from the foreign company to the U.S. parent company.
The Regulations under § 482 now provide that where one member of a
group of controlled entities makes a loan or advance directly or indirectly to
another member of such group and charges either no interest or interest not equal
to an arm's length rate, the Service may make appropriate allocations to reflect
an arm's length interest rate.2 For purposes of computation, the arm's length
necessary of gross income, deductions, credits or allowances; or of any item or element affecting
taxable income, between or among the controlled taxpayers constituting the group. Treas.
Reg. § 1.482-1(b) (1) (1968).
18 Id.
19 By filing consolidated returns as authorized by INT. Rav. CODE, op 1954 §§ 1501-1505
the corporate group will be taxed only on the profits represented by its transactions with the
outside world. For example, assume Corporation A owns both B and C, that B manufactures
widgets and sells them at current wholesale prices to C, which sells them to the public. Assume
that B and C both distribute part of their profits to A in the form of dividends. In any given
year, B may be operating at a profit while C is operating at a loss. By filing a consolidated
return, in effect C's loss is offset against B's gain and the dividends paid to A by B and C are
disregarded. With the virtual elimination of the advantages of multiple surtax exemptions this
year, many corporate groups may be expected to turn to consolidated returns and the broad
applicability of § 482 in this area will be of undeniable importance.
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(2)(3) (1968).
21 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (1968).
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a)(1) (1968). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(4) which
provides that "if one member of a group lends money to a second member of a group in a
taxable year, the district director may make an appropriate allocation to reflect an arm's length
charge for interest during such taxable year even if the second member does not realize income
during such year. The provisions of this subparagraph apply even if the gross income contem-
plated from a series of transactions is never, in fact, realized by the other members." Id.
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interest rate is the rate of interest that would have been charged at the time the
indebtedness arose in independent transactions with or between unrelated parties
under similar circumstances. 2
The Regulations also provide that where one member of a group of con-
trolled entities performs marketing, managerial, administrative, technical, or other
services for the benefit of another member of the group without charge or at a
charge not equal to an arm's length charge,24 the Service may allocate to reflect
an arm's length charge for such services.25 Accordingly, allocations may be made
to reflect charges for services undertaken for the joint benefit of the members of
a controlled group and for services performed by one member of the group ex-
clusively for the benefit of another member. In general, allocations may be made
if the service, at the time it was performed, related to the carrying on of an
activity by another member or was intended to benefit another member, either in
the member's overall operations or in its day-to-day activities.2"
However, these allocations will not be required if the probable benefits to
the foreign affiliates are so indirect or remote as to be negligible. In addition,
allocations will not be required if the services are performed by one affiliate, e.g.,
the parent company, for its own benefit, or if the service rendered merely
duplicates services which the affiliate concerned has itself performed.2 The
Regulations require that if the services rendered are not part of the trade or busi-
ness of the parent company, only costs (deductions) must be charged out.2"
Where possession, use, or occupancy of tangible property owned or leased by
one member is transferred by lease or other arrangement to another member of
the group without charge or at one not equal to an arm's length rental, the
Service may reallocate income. 9 The determination of an arm's length rental
depends on whether either affiliate is in the business of leasing the type of asset or
property involved. If so, the arm's length criterion is actual rentals charged by
either affiliate in independent leasing transactions. The more common situation,
however, is where neither affiliate is in the leasing business-the most typical
case being where one affiliate allows another use of capital equipment in its manu-
facturing operations, either rent-free or at a bargain rental. An arm's length
rental charge would be the rental charged for the use of the same or similar prop-
erty, during the time it was in use, in independent transactions between unrelated
parties under similar circumstances considering the period and location of the
use, the owner's investment in the property or rent paid for the property, expenses
23 Specific computation for applicable interest rates is provided by Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
2 (a) (2) (1968). Read literally, the regulations require that where there are loan transactions
with a number of members of a controlled group the arm's length standard is to be applied
to each transaction on a separate basis rather than on an overall group basis.
24 For an application here of analogous criteria to Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a) (2) in regard
to arm's length charge, see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b) (3), (6) (1968).
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b)(1) (1968). See, e.g., Glen A. Jordan, 60 T.C. 872 (1973).
26 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b) (2) (1968).
27 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b) (2) (1968) contains some examples which are helpful in
clarifying these principles.
28 But see Philipp Bros. Chemical Inc. v. Comm'r., 435 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'g 52
T.C. 240 (1969).
29 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(c) (1) (1968). See B. A. Boyer, 58 T.C. 316 (1972).
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of maintaining the property, the type of property involved, its condition, and all
other relevant facts.80
Members of a controlled group must charge each other an arm's length
price whenever intangible property or any interest therein is sold, transferred,
assigned, loaned, or otherwise made available by one member. Intangible
property includes patents, inventions, copyrights, trademarks, franchises, licenses
and contracts, as well as methods, programs, customer lists and numerous other
similar items. 1 The Service may make appropriate allocations 2 and the object
is to assure that any benefit conferred prompts a corresponding charge equal to
that which unrelated parties would normally expect to incur.' 3
Where a controlled group member sells tangible property to another
member, the Service may appropriately allocate to reflect the price that an un-
related party would have paid, reflecting a normal profit.'
B. Methods of Adjustment
The method of allocating, apportioning, or distributing income, deductions,
credits, and allowances is determined with reference to the substance of the
particular transactions or arrangements which result in the avoidance of taxes
or the failure to clearly reflect income.8 5 This broad power is made somewhat
more specific by the regulations which state that "the appropriate adjustments
may take the form of an increase or decrease in gross income, 6 increase or de-
crease in deductions (including depreciation), increase or decrease in basis of
assets, or any other adjustment which may be appropriate under the circum-
stances." 7
30 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(c) (2) (1968). As is true of the intercompany interest situation,
the regulations here furnish a specific formula by which to compute an acceptable arm's length
rental. Even if neither affiliate regularly leases tangible property in an activity that would be
tantamount to a trade or business, the taxpayer still retains the right to establish a rental which
would constitute an arm's length charge by reference to actual facts and circumstances in lieu
of the established formula.
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d) (3) (1968).
32 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d) (1) (1968). But see R. T. French Co., 60 T.C. 836 (1973).
33 Treas. Reg. 1.482-2(d)(2) (1968).
An important exception to the above allocation rules relating to intangibles covers the
situation in which an affiliate acquiring an interest in intangible property acquires it by being
a participant in a bona fide cost-sharing arrangement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d) (4)
(1968).
34 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e)(1) (1968).
35 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(1) (1968).
36 For example, in Borge v. Comm'r., 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), a prominent enter-
tainer entered into an employment arrangement with his wholly owned company (which was
losing money in the poultry business) for $50,000 per year. The corporation hired out his
services and earned average annual profits of about $160,000 from this part of its business(before payment of his salary). The Commissioner was upheld in his reallocation under § 482
of about $325,000 of additional salary to Mr. Borge over the five-year period. Accord, Richard
Rubin, 56 T.C. 1155 (1971).
See also Advance Machinery Exchange, Inc. v. Comm'r., 196 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1952)
where an analogous method was used in a reallocation of income between corporations con-
trolled by the same individuals.
37 In Oil Base, Inc. v. Comm'r., 362 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1966), the parent corporation
granted its wholly owned subsidiary commission and discounts twice as large as those allowed
uncontrolled sales representatives. Under § 482, the commissioner was successful in his reallo-
cation of portions of the subsidiary's sales income to the parent on the basis of what would
have been the parent's arm's length arrangements with uncontrolled parties.
Likewise, in Eli Lilly & Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990 (Ct. Cl. 1967) the commis-
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Whenever the district director makes adjustments to the income of one
member of a group of controlled taxpayers, he shall make appropriate correlative
adjustments to the income of any other member involved in the allocation. The
correlative adjustment must actually be made if the United States income tax
liability of the other members would be affected for any pending taxable year.
Thus, if the district director increases the income of one member of the group,
he will decrease the income of the other member if such adjustment would have
an effect on the United States income tax liability of the other member for any
pending taxable year. 8
C. Court Decisions-Genesis of § 482
The statute and regulations as to reallocation were very simple until the
1960's." In fact, § 482 was used relatively little in its early years. Under § 45,
the predecessor of § 482, the Commissioner could not (1) create income where
none existed,4" (2) disallow a proper deduction,41 (3) combine or consolidate net
income of separate but related taxpayers if their businesses were conducted sepa-
rately without distortion of income, 2 or (4) compel an arbitrary allocation of
intercompany expenses if the taxpayer's allocation was reasonable. 3
A number of events occurred which made § 482 more important. The
Revenue Acts of 1950 and 1951 and the excess profits tax provisions imposed
much higher corporate tax rates upon domestic corporations. As a result, there
was fear of abuse of the surtax exemption44 and the excess profits tax credit
system through the creation of subsidiaries. Thus, in response to an increased
need for control of multiple corporations, the position of courts began to evolve.
Through the early 1960's, the Service instituted a concerted enforcement
effort, with § 482 as the primary weapon, to increase the taxable income of
U.S. taxpayers, especially on transactions with foreign affiliates; more extensive
sioner successfully charged the parent manufacturing company with portions of the profits
received on sales to outsiders by its wholly owned subsidiary where the parent's sales to the
subsidiary were at less than arm's length prices.
38 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(2) (1968).
39 J. Gravelle, A History of Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, The Allocation of
Income, Deductions, Credits and Allowances between Related Corporations, April 9, 1974
(unpublished report of The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service), at 5 [herein-
after cited as Gravelle].
40 Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Company v. Comm'r., 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940). This
same view apparently prevails today in relation to § 482. For example, in Huber Homes, Inc.
v. Comm'r., 55 T.C. 598 (1971) the taxpayer transferred at its actual costs newly constructed
houses to its wholly owned subsidiary who in turn rented the houses to the public. Relying on
the holding of Tennessee-Arkansas, the Tax Court refused to create income out of the trans-
action which in the Commissioner's opinion would have produced income had the taxpayer
dealt with its subsidiary at arm's length.
41 General Industries Corp., 35 BTA 615 (1937).
42 Seminole Flavor Company, 4 T.C. 1215 (1945). For a similar view under § 482, see
cases decided under the rationale of Comm'r. v. Chelsea Products, Inc., 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir.
1952) where the court held that the commissioner may not combine net income of corporations
which are owned by the same interests where the corporations have legitimate business reasons
for the separation of their business functions.
43 Welworth Realty Co., 40 BTA 97 (1939).
44 Corporations were and are taxed under a "normal" tax and a "surtax." The first
$25,000 is exempt from the surtax. Currently, the normal tax is 22 percent and the surtax
28 percent so that a corporation is taxed at a 22 percent rate on its first $25,000 and 48 percent
on any remainder.
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regulations to § 482 were adopted. The guidelines among other things specified
a proper rate of interest for intercompany loans (between 4 and 6 percent) 45
and provided three methods of intercompany sales pricing which could serve to
avoid possible reallocation of profits where such intercompany sales were em-
ployed46
Even before the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the major focus of § 482 was
turning to foreign operations. The treatment of income and deductions of
a foreign subsidiary of a United States corporation has traditionally offered sub-
stantial tax avoidance opportunities since unrepatriated income of foreign sub-
sidiaries is not subject to U.S. taxation. Of course, this is most advantageous
when the foreign income tax rates are low.
Prior to the 1960's, § 482 was hardly used in the international field; several
factors were responsible for the increased use of the provision in the 196Ys. In
1961 the Internal Revenue Service set up the International Enforcement
Program, a more aggressive enforcement plan. Another reason was the change
in United States policy in the early 1960's toward foreign investment; prior to
that time, the policy had been to encourage such investment. During the 1960's
there began to be increasing concern as to possible adverse effects of foreign in-
vestment on domestic investment and growth, domestic employment and particu-
larly on the balance of payments. In addition, it was charged that there was
substantial growth in "tax haven" subsidiaries, some no more than a mailing
address and a lawyer's office set up for the purpose of avoiding tax.47
The incoming Kennedy administration, concerned about the balance of
trade deficit, proposed that the income of foreign subsidiaries be taxed when
earned rather than when remitted and that § 482 be revised to make it applicable
to international transactions. The tax legislation as enacted did not adopt the
administration's proposals, although it did attempt to tax some income from tax
haven countries. While Congress did not revise § 482, it did recommend that the
Internal Revenue Service promulgate regulations governing international transac-
tions under § 482 which could be viewed as a mandate for increased enforce-
ment.48 Taxes collected from foreign subsidiaries increased. The result was that
"commencing approximately with the beginning of the 1960's the Service in-
stituted a concentrated enforcement effort with § 482 as the primary weapon
to increase the taxable income of United States taxpayers on transactions with
foreign affiliates." ' The increased use of this section resulted in additional com-
pliance costs and litigation as well as increased revenues.
Not surprisingly, however, relatively little case law concerning § 482 has
45 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a) (2) (i) (1968).
46 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e) (2) (3) (4) set forth the methods as: 1) Comparable uncon-
trolled price method; 2) resale price method; and 3) cost plus method. These three prescribed
methods are not alternatives. If the first price method applies, it must be used. If the first
method does not apply, then the taxpayer must test to see if the second method applies before
the third method could be employed. Thus, these three methods are not alternatives from
which the taxpayer can choose the method most beneficial to its particular circumstances.
47 Gravelle, supra note 40, at 8.
48 Id. at 9.
49 Hammer, Section 482-Apportionment and Allocation Guidelines, N.Y.U. 26TH INST.
oN FnD. TAx 693 (1968).
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involved foreign trade.5" This may be explained by factors such as the cost and
difficulties of proof involved in litigation, the reluctance of corporations to dis-
close company pricing policies, the possible double tax burden that could result
from litigation failure, and the usual risks and uncertainties of court contests. In
any event, the prime force of § 482 has emerged in its role as silent policeman,
providing a deterrent to unlawful monetary transfers without the attendant need
for case-by-case adjudications.
Overall, there is some evidence as to the effectiveness of § 482 in the inter-
national area today. A study of § 482's impact, based on questionnaires sub-
mitted to 512 companies and 90 personal interviews, was prepared by the Con-
ference Board.5 The most important findings were:
(1) A majority of the companies surveyed (271) reported some sort of
reallocation by the IRS under § 482 in the past ten years.
(2) Of the companies which did not, over half indicated that transactions
with related parties were not significant in their international operations. How-
ever, of the companies which did consider transactions with related companies
to be of major importance, two-thirds experienced adjustments under § 482.
(3) Out of the 220 companies whose allocation cases had been settled, only
three reported that they were settled in courts.
(4) The most common type of allocation was intercompany pricing of
goods. The second most common was charge for services and the third was
adjustments for interest charged.
(5) 283 companies said they did not change their international operations
as a result of § 482; 173 reported only minor changes. 46 reported major
changes and 34 said these changes have adversely affected their ability to com-
pete.5 2 Two-thirds of these companies have foreign subsidiaries that are taxed at
substantially below U.S. rates.
One obvious problem which has occurred in this area, according to the
reports, is double taxation. If a § 482 adjustment is made years later, it is
often difficult for the company to get a refund from the foreign country and tax
treaties do not always deal with this problem.
However, the majority of criticism cited was the manner in which § 482
was administered. In spite of the extensive Treasury regulations adopted in 1968,
the respondents charged that the regulations were not followed in the field, that
arbitrary determinations were made, and that the compliance costs in defending
or settling were high. The report recommended a more detailed statute and even
more detailed regulations.
50 The following cases provide an almost exhaustive list. Frank v. International Canadian
Corp., 308 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1962); Nat Harrison Associates, Inc., 42 T.C. 601 (1964); Oil
Base, Inc., 362 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 928 (1966); Eli Lilly and
Co., 372 F.2d 990 (Ct. Cls. 1967); Colombian Rope Co., 42 T.C. 800 (1964); Woodwaid
Governor Co., 55 T.C. 56 (1970); Philipp Brothers Chemical, Inc. aff'd 435 F.2d 53 (2d Cir.
1970); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 435 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1970); PPG Industries Inc., 55
T.C. 928 (1970); American Terrazzo Strip Co., Inc., 56 T.C. 961 (1971); U.S. Gypsum Co.,
304 F. Supp. 627 '(D.C. Ill. 1969); R. T. French Co., 60 T.C. 836 (1973).
51 Gravelle, supra note 40, at 9-10.
52 Of the 34 companies that report competitive damage, eight are in the pharmaceuticals
industry. No analysis was provided of the concentration in pharmaceuticals but reasons for
extensive reallocation here might include substantial international competition or perhaps the
high proportion of expenditures for research and development.
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III. FRENCH GENERAL TAx CODE-ARTCLE 57
Article 57 of the French General Tax Code 3 declares that:
in computing the income tax owed by firms controlled by or controlling
firms outside France, profits indirectly transferred to the latter, either by
increase or reduction of purchase or sale prices, or in any other way are in-
cluded in the taxpayer's reported profits. The same rule applies to firms
forming part of a group or controlled by a firm which also controls firms
outside France.
In the absence of precise information on the basis of which the adjust-
ments provided for in the preceding paragraph can be made, the taxable
income is determined by comparison with that of similar firms normally
operated.
As is true with its American counterpart, § 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code, article 57 is enjoying an ever-expanding interpretation in response to the
rapid development of international trade.54 Article 57 of the Tax Code is cur-
rently being used as authority for the Tax Service to adjust and subject to court
review the income reported by French firms controlled by or controlling firms
outside France.5
At the outset, theoretical application of article 57 poses a twofold problem:
The control relationship between the French company and the foreign company
must be established, and then there must be shown the existence of an indirect
profit transfer from the French firm to the affiliated foreign firm of the same
group.
Article 57 of the General Tax Code applies to a French firm controlled by
a foreign firm, a French firm controlling a foreign firm, or a French firm con-
trolled, along with one or more foreign firms, by a single firm, group, or con-
sortium. Article 57 does not define "control" which may be de jure or de facto.56 A
French firm is "controlled" by a foreign firm when the latter holds a majority of
the outstanding shares or an absolute majority of the votes which may be cast in
shareholders' meetings. The same conclusion is reached when the foreign firm,
directly or by nominee," holds office(s) in the French firm which carries the
power of decision.
A control relationship exists when one company holds a majority of the
other's shares and both are managed by the same directors or executive officers.5"
53 CODE GiN-RALE DES IMPOTs, art 57.
54 The expanding interpretation now accorded to article 57 is embodied in a memorandum
of May 4, 1973, published by the General Tax Service of France. Bulletin Officiel de la Direc-
tion Gn6rale des Impots. This memorandum, hereinafter cited as B.O.D.G.I., 4-A-2-73,
is the latest administrative pronouncement on the subject forthcoming from the French Govern-
ment. The information contained in that memorandum forms the crux of the material used
in the discussion of article 57 in this paper.
55 Internationally, treaties for the avoidance of double taxation also contain provisions
similar to those of article 57.
56 B.O.D.G.I., supra note 54, 4-A-2-73 at 6.
57 "Nominee" is defined to include:
-Managers, directors, officers of the controlling firm (and members of their families);
-Any other firm controlled by the controlling firm;
-Any person having an interest in the business of either firm or holding shares thereof
(B.O.D.G.I., supra note 54, 4-A-2-73 at 6).
58 Judgment of Jan. 3, 1946, [1946] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 71-963, R.O. at 3.
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Thus, article 57 is particularly likely to be applicable in parent-subsidiary situa-
tions." If de jure control cannot be shown, evidence of de facto control must be
adduced. The control relationship may arise from contract or from the con-
ditions under which the intercompany relationships are established.
In order to make the adjustments provided by article 57 of the Tax Code,
the Service must show not only that the French firm is controlled by, or controls
a foreign firm, but also that the transactions subject to adjustment constitute an
indirect transfer of profits abroad outside the regular management of the business.
The French Tax Service has noted that when affiliated firms controlled
by industrial or financial groups having international ramifications are involved,
the transfer procedures used generally result in concentration of most of the
group profits in the countries having the lowest tax rates. Under the terms of
article 57, such indirect profit transfers may be effected either by increase in or
reduction of sale or purchase prices or in any other way. Other ways the Service
has mentioned in particular are payment of royalties which are excessive or with-
out consideration, grant of loans without interest or at reduced interest rates, for-
giveness of indebtedness (waiver of stipulated interest), payment of compensation
disproportionate to the service rendered, and high contribution to the group's
general or research expenses."'
A. General Application
The French Tax Service will scrutinize either de jure or de facto control
and will closely examine any indirect transfer of profits abroad which are out-
side the regular management of the business.
1. Increased Purchase or Reduced Sale Prices
Recognizing that affiliated selling companies are natural outlets for the
59 Judgment of May 23, 1960, [1960] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 42-218; judgment of Feb.
23, 1966, [1966] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 64-449; Judgment of April 18, 1966, [1966] Rec.
Cons. d'Et., app. No. 63-621.
60 The de facto control concept is illustrated by many cases:
Thus, a control relationship has been found in the case of a French company bound by
contract to a foreign company which fixed the purchase and sales prices of the former, which
had to report its operations and pay large royalties merely for use of a trademark belonging
to the foreign firm. (Judgment of March 23, 1953, [1953] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 75-326,
R.O. at 226).
Likewise, in a Judgment of May 6, 1966, [1966] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 62-129,
R.O., at 159; it was held that a French company obtaining some of its contracts through a
Moroccan company to which it paid out of its total profits, including those deriving from
contracts in which the Moroccan company was not involved, amounts disproportionate to the
services rendered by the latter campany, must be considered as controlled by the foreign company
within the meaning of article 57 of the Code.
A control relationship was also found by the' Conseil d'Etat in a case in which a French firm
and a foreign firm having the same name manufactured the same type of product, used the
services of the same representatives and on occasion divided the orders obtained by such repre-
sentatives. (Judgment of Jan. 29, 1964, [1964] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 47-515, R.O. at 20.)
In a judgment of Aug. 3, 1942, [1942] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 65-810, R.O. at 177, the
Conseil d'Etat held that a French firm must be considered to be controlled by a foreign firm
when, undercapitalized and able to operate in its early years due only to very substantial ad-
vances received from the latter, it contented itself with exploiting in France the foreign firm's
patents and processes and the foreign firm regularly supervised its operations and audited its
books. (B.O.D.G.I., supra note 54, 4-A-2-73 at 6-7.)
61 B.O.D.G.I., supra note 54, 4-A-2-73 at 7.
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distribution of the group products, the French Tax Service carefully scrutinizes
whether a French subsidiary's purchases from the foreign firm are made at
reduced prices. If so, there would be an indirect transfer abroad of profits real-
ized by and taxable to the French company.6 2 To determine the existence of such
a transfer, the Tax Service refers to the prices at which the foreign manufacturer
generally sells the same products to independent companies.
Enforcement in this area is strict. For example, in a judgment of June 17,
1959,6" the Conseil d'Etat held that the benefit conferred by a French company
on its foreign subsidiary by selling its products thereto at prices appreciably lower
than those charged on the French and international markets constituted a trans-
fer of profits. Since that time, case law on the point has continued to increase.6"
However, the Tax Service has run into difficulties in attempting to demon-
strate overbilling or underbilling. The difficulties have arisen for two major
reasons: (1) the specificity of the imported products which often makes it diffi-
cult to use terms of comparison or (2) the fact that the service is not authorized
to investigate the foreign firm to determine whether it charges its subsidiary sale
prices differing from those which it charges other customers. Only nominal relief
is provided by the General Administration of Customs and Indirect Duties which
can provide lists of prices at which foreign manufacturers sell certain products
to independent companies. 5
2. Payment of Excessive Royalties
French companies controlled by foreign companies often pay large royalties
to the latter. Such royalties stipulated by contract are calculated to compensate
for services rendered by the parent company. The Service first determines
whether the outlays are legitimate and then whether they are commensurate
with the service actually rendered. The Tax Service has noted that amounts
paid on account of these services may be high without being unlawfully exces-
sive.
6 7
French companies can and frequently do utilize one of two defenses: (1)
The royalty payment made to the parent by the French subsidiary is propor-
tionate to the amount of research and development costs borne by the group as
a whole; or (2) The royalty payment made to the parent company is equal to
the value of the assistance which the parent company has rendered to its sub-
sidiary.
In the frequent case when the parent company supplies the subsidiary, the
French Tax Service has vowed to insure that the subsidiary does not make a dual
62 Judgment of Jan. 29, 1964, [1964] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 47-515, R.O. at 20;
Judgment of April 13, 1964, [1964] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 56-173, R.O. at 69.
63 Judgment of June 17, 1959, [1959] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 38-476, R.O. at 466.
64 Judgment of May, 23, 1960, [1960] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 42-218, Judgment of
Jan. 29, 1964, [1964] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 47-515, R.O. at 20.
65 B.O.D.G.I., supra note 54, 4-A-2-73 at 7.
66 Id. at 8.
67 However, authorization granted by the Ministry of Industrial and Scientific Development
or by any other technical department on the subject of the rate of the royalty or of transfer of
the amount thereof abroad, are not binding on the Revenue Service. B.O.D.G.I., supra note
54, 4-A-2-73 at 8.
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contribution to the research costs, on the one hand by paying a royalty based on
its sale, and on the other hand by paying for the products bought from the for-
eign company at a price which already makes allowances for the group research
costs. The amount of royalties must reflect whether the French company confers
benefits on the foreign company, especially where the subsidiary frequently pro-
vides in toto for the cost of operating the sales network as well as the advertising
and informational expenses.6"
3. Loans by the Foreign Company on Unusual Terms
The Tax Service recognized that a French company may substantially
benefit a controlled foreign corporation by making loans to it without provision for
interest or at a low interest rate. Under decisions of the Conseil d'Etat concern-
ing article 57, such transactions are presumed to constitute transfers of profits
abroad.69
When such an indirect transfer is discovered, generally there is restored to
the French company's taxable income a normal interest amount. The rate may
be the average interest rate on security loans charged by the Banque de France 0
or the interest rate paid by the French firm on its own borrowings.",
However, the Conseil d'Etat has ruled72 that waiver of interest does not
constitute a transfer of profits within the meaning of article 57 where a foreign
subsidiary which has already had the benefit of advances for which the French
parent company's guarantee is required is in a difficult financial position. The
Conseil d'Etat considered that the French parent company had attempted to avoid
losses which would have exceeded the interest amount waivered. Failure of the
foreign subsidiary would have adversely affected the parent company's credit.
4. Flat Contribution to the Operating Expenses of a Foreign Subsidiary
Industrial firms often organize joint subsidiaries abroad for design, manu-
facture, sales, or purchases for account of all members. The division of expenses
of such subsidiaries among all of the partners raises difficult problems. Thus,
the Tax Service has promulgated no mandatory rules of expense division for
use in this area.
In general, however, three methods of allocation have emerged and all have
been used with increasing frequency by the Service. First, the Service has recom-
mended and the Conseil d'Etat has authorized the restoration to income of sums'
paid by way of flat contribution to the operating expenses of a foreign subsidiary,
to the extent they exceed commissions normally due.73 Likewise, with reference
to expenses incurred for the joint account of French and foreign firms, the Con-
68 B.O.D.G.I., supra note 54, 4-A-2-73 at 8.
69 Judgment of July 7, 1958, [1958] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 35-977, R.O. at 188,
Judgment of June 14, 1963, 1963] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 57-457, R.O. at 362; Judgment
of Dec. 21, 1964, [1964] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 54-142 and 56-200.
70 Judgment of Oct. 21, 1970, [1970] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 71-071; B.O.D.G.I., supra
note 54, 4-A-5-71.
71 Judgment of Nov. 7, 1963, [1963] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 57-183, R.O. at 428.
72 Judgment of Jan. 13, 1967, [1967] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 68-139.
73 Judgment of April 18, 1966, [1966] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 63-621.
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sell d'Etat has agreed in principle to a flat division. The least controversial
method consists of dividing joint expenses into the ratio between the sales of
the French firm and the total sales of the group."'
In addition, two other allocation methods have been employed: (1) the
ratio of the French firm's gross proceeds to the gross profit of the entire group
and (2) the ratio of the French firm's assets to those of the group. Yet, no matter
which method is adopted, it must always be ascertained that the division formula
is based on comparable elements.76
B. Methods of Adjustment
Under article 57 of the French General Tax Code, the amount of taxable
income is determined either directly by restoration to the reported income of
profits wrongfully transferred out of France or by comparison with the taxable
income of similar, normally operated firms."
1. Direct Assessment Method
The adjustments provided for in article 57 must be made on the specific
elements of the transaction which resulted in the indirect monetary transfer.
Assessment by comparison is permitted only alternatively and in the absence of
precise information."8 Thus, the direct assessment procedure will be generally
applied in case of waiver or absence of interest, compensation without consider-
ation, excessive royalties, or price reduction.
2. Alternative Assessment Method
Article 57 provides that in the absence of specific information permitting
determination of the taxable income of the French firm, recourse may be made
to an arbitrary assessment based on comparison with the earnings of indepen-
dent firms engaged in the same business. It had been held, for example, that the
taxable income was validly determined by application to sales of a profit coeffi-
cient fixed by comparison with that of similar, normally operated firms.79 The
amounts restored by the Service to taxable income must be treated as distributed
revenues on the basis of applicable Tax Code provisions."s
C. Administrative Procedures
It appears from the decisions of the Conseil d'Etat that article 57 of the
General Tax Code can be applied only if it is established that special benefits
74 Judgment of May 8, 1964, [1964] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. Nos. 66-968 and 68-362.
75 Judgment of April 25, 1960, [1960] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 45-099, P. 0. at 60.
76 B.O.D.G.I., supra note 54, 4-A-2-73 at 9.
77 B.O.D.G.I., supra note 54, 4-A-2-73 at 11.
78 Judgment of Nov. 23, 1960, [1960] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 48-570.
79 Judgment of March 23, 1953, [1953] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 75-326, R.O. at 266.
80 If the referenced fiscal year was a profit year, then art. 109-1-1" of the General Tax
Code applies. If such a year was a loss year and the foreign company receiving the proceeds
indirectly transferred is a partner or shareholder of the French company then Art. 109-1-2"
and 111 are to be applied. Finally, art. 111(c) covers the hidden benefits if either of the two
preceding provisions cannot be applied. (B.O.D.G.I., supra note 54, A-2-73 at 12.)
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have been conferred on the foreign company. The Service has the burden of
proving the existence of such benefits and the amount thereof. 1 However, the
French company is entitled to introduce evidence to the contrary and show that
the apparently irregular transaction is in fact justified by operational necessities.82
1. Special Benefits Conferred on the Foreign Firm
The existence of special benefits raises a presumption of transfer of profits.
There is no particular method of proof and the burden is on the Service to prove,
by ordinary procedures, the irregular nature of the transaction which it wishes
to adjust.8 '
When the taxpayer does not agree to the adjustments proposed by the Ser-
vice, the disagreement may be submitted to the Departmental Commission of
Direct and Turnover Taxes, which has jurisdiction to determine all questions
of fact relating to the existence and amount of profits transferred abroad. 4
If the commission approves the adjustment, the burden is on the taxpayer
to prove the nonexistence of the benefits or the excessiveness of the Service's
assessment.8 ' If the administrative court finds that it lacks information, it may
order an expert appraisement for the purpose of establishing that the French
company has not conferred benefits on its foreign subsidiary or that such benefits
did not constitute a transfer of profits in favor of such subsidiary. 8
2. Presumption of Transfer
As stated above, when the existence of benefits conferred by the French
firm on the foreign firm is established, article 57 creates a rebuttable presumption
of transfer of profits abroad.
The Tax Service recognizes a French firm's right to adduce evidence that
the benefits arising from transactions with a foreign firm answer to actual com-
mercial necessities and not to a design to transfer profits. For example, as to
certain aspects of the export trade, article 57 should not systematically be applied
when the French firm establishes that transfers to its foreign subsidiary at a sale
price approximating the manufacturing costs are motivated by commercial ad-
vantage and not by an intention to transfer profits. 7
Generally, the Tax Service considers the entirety of the commercial trans-
actions including those effected by such subsidiary. Thus, when the French com-
pany reduces its manufacturing profit in order to allow its subsidiary a merchan-
dising margin adequate to meet competitive necessities while providing it with
81 As noted earlier, the Service must first have adduced evidence of the control relation-
ship between the foreign company and the French company.
82 B.O.D.G.I., supra note 54, 4-A-2-73 at 9, 10.
83 Id. at 8.
84 Judgment of Jan. 29, 1964, [1964] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 47-515, R.O. at 20.
85 Judgment of Jan. 29, 1964, 119641 Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 47-515, R.O. at 20;judgment of April 13, 1964, [1964] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 56-173, R.O. at 69; Judgment
of May 6, 1966, [1966] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 62-129; R.O. at 159; judgment of June 19,
1970, [1970], Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 76-270; B.O.D.G.I. 4-A-5-70.
86 Judgment of April 13, 1964, [1964 Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 56-173, R.O. at 69.
87 B.O.D.G.I., supra note 54, 1959-11-893. An elaboration of this memorandum is provided
in another memorandum of May 18, 1972 (B.O.D.G.L, supra note 54, 4-A-6-72).
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essential operating facilities, the Service gathers all information to determine
whether the transfer price approximating the manufacturing cost in France is
actually required by commercial necessities.
Case law has approved the legitimacy of: (1) financial assistance to a
subsidiary experiencing difficulties when the expansion of the French firm
abroad might be otherwise adversely affected,"8 and (2) royalties paid to a for-
eign parent company at a nonexcessive rate for the use of trademarks which had
not formed part of the contributions of the foreign company upon organization
of the French subsidiary.8"
Thus, the application of article 57 of the General Tax Code relates to a
certain extent to the broader concept of irregular acts .of management and the
indirect transfer of any special benefits under whatever guise possible. While a
firm may adduce countervailing evidence in the cases of financial assistance,
payment of royalties, and other cases, it is much more difficult to justify such
payments in the context of article 57 of the General Tax Code, since the taxpayer
must rebut a presumption created by law.9
D. Summary
Recent case law and pronouncements of the General Tax Service indicate
a growing importance for article 57 in French law. Though guidelines are still
developing, the expansiveness of article 57's interpretations cannot be denied.
Without a doubt, article 57 will require increasing diligence for multinational
concerns which are controlled by or who control interests in France.
IV. Comparison
Both § 482 of the United States Internal Revenue Code and article 57 of
the French General Tax Code are aimed at controlling those national enterprises
which form a part of multinational corporations falling within their respective
national jurisdictions. The reasons are twofold: (1) to create a parity between
related and unrelated taxpayers, and (2) to afford a measure of control over
undesired monetary transfers among subsidiaries in the multinational group.
Governmental control is understandable considering the vast amounts of money
moving within a multinational empire and the possible tax evasion or general
economic disruption that may result.
Both § 482 and article 57 were originally enacted to deter tax evasion by
related taxpayers organized and doing business within the same country. But,
with the rapid growth of multinational trade in the last several years, their exten-
sion to the international scene has certainly been logical.
Interestingly enough, the conditions required for the operation of the two
88 Judgment of Dec. 11, 1970, [1970], Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 78-698.
89 Judgment of June 19, 1970, [1970], Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 76-270; B.O.D.G.I.,
supra note 54, 4-A-5-70.
90 Judgment of July 7, 1958, [1958] Rec. Cons. d'Et., app. No. 35-977, R.O. at 188. For
example, in that judgment the evidence adduced was rejected as to loans without interest made
to a foreign subsidiary-a transaction to which article 57 applied-while such evidence was
admitted as to loans made to other subsidiaries located in France along with the parent company.
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provisions-related control and prohibited monetary transfer-are identical in
theory. Yet, despite the theoretical similarity between § 482 and article 57, the
provisions are not without their differences. Moreover, these dissimilarities relate
not only to the terminology employed but also to the application and adminis-
tration of the enactments as well.
A. Terminology
Unlike article 57, § 482 applies to any group of related taxpayers, even
though members of such a group are individual as opposed to corporate tax-
payers. 1 In this respect, § 482 must be viewed as having broader application
than article 57.
Section 482 applies to related taxpayers that are owned or controlled di-
rectly or indirectly by the same interests. The Regulations provide that such a
requisite "control" relation will include any kind of control, direct or indirect,
whether legally enforceable and however exercised.
Article 57, on the other hand, is more explicit on the question of control.
The interpretation of the General Tax Service limits article 57 to either de jure
or de facto control relationships. While these two concepts do give rather wide
latitude to the application of article 57's provisions, they fall short of the un-
fettered "control" standard outlined in § 482.
Section 482 proves to be broader in yet another area. Section 482, by its
terms, operates not only on direct or indirect transfers of "income" between or
among related taxpayers but also on the transfer of deductions, credits, or allow-
ances. More restrictively, operation of article 57 hinges only on profits directly
or indirectly transferred among related firms--profits which should have been
declared by a French company and which ultimately come to rest outside France.
Whether this difference is of any consequence in the everyday practice of multi-
national firms remains positively unanswerable. In the case of either § 482 or
article 57, the deterrent forces of possible double taxation and the high cost of
litigation prohibit many transfers which might not otherwise be covered by the
exact terms of the two acts.
B. Application
It is interesting to note the similarity between the areas of special scrutiny
under § 482 and article 57. Under § 482, the IRS pays close attention to mone-
tary transfers between related organizations which have traditionally been utilized
as vehicles for tax evasion. These areas were defined to be loans or advances,
performance of services for another, use of tangible property, transfer or use of
intangible property, and sales of tangible property. Correspondingly, the French
Tax Service has vowed to give close attention to: increased purchase or reduced
sale prices, payment of excessive royalties, loans by the foreign company on un-
usual terms, and flat contributions to the operating expenses of foreign sub-
sidiaries.
91 See, e.g., Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968).
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Though § 482 has reached prominence as a vehicle for the reallocation of
income between enterprises in the international sphere only within the last fifteen
years, an important body of domestic case law in the area of income reallocation
gave added meaning to § 482s application in the international sector. Article
57, on the other hand, has only paralleled the growth of international trade dur-
ing the last decade and its development as a governmental enforcement tool is
necessarily less pronounced. In any event, it is safe to predict that article 57 will
enjoy an ever-broadening interpretation and that its use as a deterrent to unde-
sired monetary transfers will soon require the same sophisticated scrutiny that is
now applied to transactions between related taxpayers under the guise of § 482.
The methods of applying § 482 and article 57 are also somewhat different.
According to the Treasury Regulations under § 482, the Commissioner is em-
powered to increase or decrease gross income, deductions, credits, depredation,
or the basis of any assets or to make any other adjustment he deems appropriate
to clearly reflect the income of the related parties. Sole discretion in the deter-
mination of true taxable income is left to the IRS commissioner who is guided
only in theory by the arm's length test.
Pursuant to article 57 of the General Tax Code, however, the power of the
French Tax Service is more limited. Lacking discretion in the reallocation of
profits, the Tax Service is provided with only two methods to redistribute profits
wrongfully transferred abroad-the direct assessment method or the alternative
assessment method.
C. Administration
Under article 57, a legal presumption of transfers of profit will arise once
benefits conferred by the French firm on the foreign firm are established. How-
ever, the French firm, in all cases, may rebut the presumption by showing either
that the benefits did not constitute a transfer of profits abroad or that the transfer
was motivated by a commercial advantage and not a desire to prejudice the
French Treasury. The burden of showing a prohibited transfer of profits rests
ultimately with the Tax Service.
Pursuant to § 482, the IRS is charged with finding and collecting any dis-
crepancy that may exist in true taxable income that has been declared or not
declared by taxpayers within a related group. Unlike the administration of
article 57, the ultimate presumption under § 482 must fairly be said to reside with
the commissioner.
This last point is especially important in demonstrating the contrast be-
tween the positions of a multinational firm liable to income tax in France and/
or liable to tax in the United States. Under the French Code, there is a basic
principle of tax law that strictly interprets the tax statutes in favor of the tax-
payer. According to this principle, the benefit of the doubt goes to the taxpayer
who will not be taxed unless the law explicitly provides for it.0 2 The United
States position, while approximating the position of France in theory, is consider-
ably less favorable to the multinational concern. Vested with very broad powers
92 R. DAVID, FRENCH LAw, ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY, 136 (1972).
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and the ability to reallocate income deductions, credits, and allowances in any
transactions between related taxpayers which he deems appropriate, the U.S.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue has an almost unchallengeable position under
current practice.
V. Conclusion
The increasing prominence of multinational enterprises has been paralleled
by an increasing desire for more governmental control over them. This control,
desired for reasons of tax equity and general economic tranquility, has been
forthcoming in several countries through the use of broadly based reallocation
provisions. The trend is toward even greater use of these laws.
Section 482 of the IRC may perhaps be regarded as the grandfather of these
statutes. 3 Developing slowly through the domestic sphere and then in the
international sector, its grant of extensive power to the Internal Revenue Service
cannot be denied. Though application and administration of § 482 is not with-
out its faults, the criticisms volleyed against § 482 do little if anything to abate
its strength.
Article 57 of the General Tax Code is only now emerging as the French
government's prime weapon against the allocation of taxable income to related
firms outside France. Case law and pronouncements of the French Tax Service
show it to be less potent than § 482. Yet, as the French Tax Service has de-
clared, the expansion of international operations now raises the possibility of
hidden profit transfers by smaller and smaller firms. The response of the General
Tax Service has been an avowal to give increasingly closer attention to trans-
actions between all affiliated companies in order to detect monetary transfers of
every kind.
Of course, § 482 and article 57 are not the only weapons that are useful in
the reallocation of income or profits by these national governments. Treaty pro-
visions for the avoidance of double taxation do not greatly differ from those of the
two acts. Accordingly, these treaties are often construed in pari materia.
The potential ramifications for the multinational concern can be dramatic
indeed. And since § 482 and article 57 are so similar, it is fairly safe to predict
that application of article 57 will become even more aggressive as multinational
firms establish more and more subsidiaries in France during the years ahead. A
multinational operation involved with these and similar laws must pay con-
stantly greater attention to all intercompany transactions and must endeavor not
to offend these provisions. For the multinational, the cost of compliance may
prove high. Yet, the cost of noncompliance will almost certainly be higher.
David P. Quint
93 For a list of countries with similar provisions, see Note, The Swiss Base Company:
Tax Avoidance Device for Multinationals, 50 NOTRE. DAME LAWYER 645, 649 n. 43.
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